Extended Maritime Jurisdiction and Its Impact on South Asia by Shyam, Manjula R.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125 
EXTENDED MARITIME JURISDICTION AND ITS IMPACT ON SOUTH ASIA 
Manjula R. Shyam 
George Williams College and 
California Institute of Technology 
al.c:_,1\lUTE OF \'\"" 1'1; �,.. �� � � i".'.: - 0 
� Q
.;.. � 
� � 
� «c: 
-P",..11 .... � SlfALL ti\fi.�\. 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 369 
February 1981 
ABSTRACT 
Extension of zones of national jurisdiction under UNCLOS III 
has increased maritime contiguity among Bangladesh, India, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka. lt raises possibilities of conflict on boundary 
delimitation, transnational stocks and pollution and also presents 
opportunities for joint efforts in the exploration and exploitation of 
marine resources. 
EXTENDED MARITIME JURISDICTION AND ITS IMPACT ON SOUTH ASIA 
Manjula R. Shyam 
Historically transnational relationships have been oriented 
almost entirely to land and its resources. Given the land based 
nature of homo sapiens, this is nqt surprising. The concept of 
territory, an essential element of statehood, was also land based as 
the origin of the word itself suggests (terra = earth). Territory 
provides shelter, security and privacy on the one hand and is a 
springboard for opportunity and exclusive use on the other. Oceans 
did not fit the bill. By and large they were seen as a moat or a 
buffer separating the states. Oceans could not be occupied, were of 
limited use and only of peripheral concern to most peoples. As Hugo 
Grotius wrote in 16 04: 
The vagrant waters of the ocean are thus necessarily free. The 
right of occupation, again, rests upon the fact that most things 
become exhausted by promiscuous use and that appropriation 
consequently is the condition of their utility to human beings. 
But this is not the case with the sea; it can be exhausted neither 
by navigation nor by fishing, that is to say, in neither of the 
two ways in which it can be used.1 
However in the last four decades, intensive and extensive 
exploitation of the seas has led to the depletion of some fish stocks. 
Search for food and mineral resources in the ocean has brought about 
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an expansion in the concept of territoriality with many states 
claiming jurisdiction in the seas. The race to carve up the oceans 
has touched off memories of the colonial era and fears of new 
conflict. Consequently attempts have been made at the international 
level to provide uniform and agreed upon rules for the use of the 
oceans. The most recent and unquestionably the most significant 
effort to legislate the rights and duties of states and to regulate 
the use of the oceans is the Third Law of the Sea Conference which 
began formally in 1973 and is expected to conclude in 1981. 
The new ocean regime will affect states in varying degrees. 
This paper examines the effect of one aspect of the new ocean 
regime -- the extended national jurisdiction in the oceans -- on the 
relationships among the coastal countries of South Asia. The Indian 
Ocean has generally been studied in the context of the military 
rivalry between the great powers and its effect on the power equation 
of the Indian Ocean countries. Here I will discuss the ways in which 
the present and potential economic use of the Indian Ocean may lead. to 
conflict and cooperation among Bangladesh, · India, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka. 
With a few notable exceptions, marine policy still plays a 
minor role in the foreign policy of nations. The relationship among 
nations constitutes a complex whole and a single component, the role 
of marine issues, cannot easily be isolated. Existing political 
rivalries may be exacerbated by disputes on distribution of marine 
resources; the existence of cordial relations between two countries 
may increase the likelihood of a satisfactory resolution of 
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differences on the use of ocean resources. The converse of these 
statements is also true. Disputes over the allocation of marine 
resources may vitiate the entire range of relations between two 
countries while cooperative efforts in ocean resource management may 
widen the area of common interests. 
EXTENDED NATIONAL JURISDI CTION AND SOUTH ASIA 
Under the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereafter 
referred to as the Draft Treaty), the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. The South Asian 
states, like other developing countries with long coastlines and 
without the capability to fish in distant waters, were strong 
supporters of the 200-miles EEZ2 and have already incorporated it in 
their national legislation. 3 Table 1 summarizes the information about 
the gain in ocean space for the countries of South Asia. 
Table 1 Here 
As far as mineral resources of the seabed are concerned, the 
Draft Treaty states that coastal states shall have exclusive rights 
over the resources of the seabed in the EEZ which extends to 200 miles 
or the edge of the continental margin, whichever is greater. States 
which either have a wide shelf or a wide continental rise, as 
evidenced by the thickness of the sedimentary rocks in proportion to 
the distance from the foot of the continental slope, will be allowed 
to establish continental margin beyond 200 miles and up to 350 miles 
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from the baseline or 100 miles from the 2, 500 meter isobath. 4 The 
concept of the outer edge of the continental margin is important for 
India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka5 because of the geomorphological 
configuration of their submarine areas which can be seen in Figure 1. 
As a result of the deltas of Indus and the Ganges, the continental 
rise extends to hundreds of miles in the Indian Ocean. 
Figure 1 Here 
The expansion of zones of national jurisdiction under UNCLOS 
I I I  has increased maritime contiguity between states of South Asia. 
Neighboring coastal states.now share long comlnon boundaries. This 
maritime contiguity can generate three types of conflicts: conflicts 
over boundaries, conflicts over resources that move across these 
boundaries and c�nflicts arising from environmentally deleterious 
effects of ocean use that transcend maritime boundaries. Each of 
these will be discussed in turn. 
I. Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries 
Delimitation of maritime boundaries between adjacent states is 
fraught with problems because configurations of the seabed and 
coastline make each situation unique and because the economic stakes 
are hig_h. The boundary may determine who shall benefit from a rich 
fishing ground or the offshore oil and gas deposits. In view of the 
hydrocarbon potential of the offshore areas, even a small section of 
the continental shelf may be highly valuable, and the willingness of 
the parties to compromise decreases in direct proportion to its 
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perceived potential. Barren rocks, reef sand islets which were of 
little significance a decade ago are now being claimed with great 
vigor as is the case with the Spratly island in the South China Sea or 
the Paracel islands that were militarily occupied by China in 197 4. 
These islands, though of little significance in themselves, have a 
continental shelf which may be petroliferous. In other instances, the 
ownership of an island may significantly alter the location of the 
median line which is used to delimit the boundary, and may make a 
difference of thousands of square miles of potentially valuable seabed 
as is the case in the Aegean Sea. 
The manifold increase in the price of petroleum has made self 
reliance on energy extremely important for economic survival and 
accounts for the aggressiveness with which states pursue their 
maritime claims. It appears as if all areas of the seabed, 
irrespective of whether they are reported to have oil potential or 
not, are perceived by the contiguous states as being valuable. This 
is not surprising since many prospective sedimentary basins in South 
Asia and elsewhere have not been adequately explored to disprove the 
possibility of oil and gas deposits.6 Table 2 shows the paucity of 
drilling in the off shore sedimentary basins of the states being 
considered here. States are reluctant to relinquish a claim to a 
seabed area which may later prove to have commercial potential and 
which could become a vital factor in their quest for energy 
independence and economic security. 
Table 2 Here 
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Boundaries between India and Pakistan and Bangladesh and India 
have not been delimited, the former because of lack of urgency and the 
latter because of conflicting claims. The boundary between India and 
Sri Lanka has been fully delimited after the problem of a small island 
in the Palk Strait was resolved. I will briefly touch on 
international law as it relates to delimitation of maritime boundaries 
before discussing the situation in South Asia. 
International law provides the general principles in light of 
which maritime boundaries between contiguous states shall be 
delimited. In consonance with the 1958 Convention on the Continental 
Shelf, the Draft Treaty states that boundaries between adjacent or 
opposite states shall be demarcated by agreement in accordance with 
equitable principles employing where appropriate the equidistance line 
and taking into account all the relevant circumstances. 7 These 
provisions are ambiguous because they do not clarify what may be 
considered the relevant circumstances or equitable principles. They 
offer no guidance about when the median line should be waived in favor 
of equitable principles. 
The median line is the most widely used criterion in 
determining maritime boundaries. Robert Hodgson, the former 
Geographer of the State Department, describes it as follows: 
A median line ( at times called 'lateral line') has proved to be 
the best solution for delineating water areas between 
sovereignties. In both theory and practice the geometrical 
principle involved in determining the median line is the most 
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satisfactory which has so far been devised, lending itself 
admirably to the construction of equitable boundaries between 
states. It depends upon precise measurement rather than 
subjective factors. Without delving into its technical 
characteristics, median line is defined as a line, or boundary, 
every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the 
lines from which it is measured.8 
The International Court of Justice in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf decision identified several circumstances which may 
modify the median line. These are: 
1. The general configuration of the coasts of the parties as well 
as the presence of any special or unusual features; 
2 .  So far as known or readily ascertainable, the physical and 
geological structure and natural resources of the continental 
shelf areas involved; 
3. The element of a reasonable degree of proportionality, which a 
delimitation carried out in accordance with equitable 
principles ought to bring about between the extent of the 
continental shelf appertaining to the coastal state and the 
length of its coast measured in the general direction of the 
coastline, account being taken for this purpose of the 
effects, actual or prospective, of any other continental shelf 
delimitations between adjacent states in the same region. 9 
These pronouncements on median line and special circumstances 
that should modify the rigid dependence on median line help put the 
boundary issues in perspective. 
Bangladesh and India have not been able to agree on maritime 
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boundaries, An area of 4, 500 square nautical miles is under dispute 
in the Bengal Basin.10 The dispute surfaced when Petro-Bangla, the 
corporation run by the Ministry of Natural Resources, signed 
production sharing contracts for conducting seismic surveys and 
exploratory drilling with six companies in 1974. The block that was 
awarded to Ashland is disputed by India which lodged a formal protest 
to Bangladesh against granting exploratory rights in that area which 
under the equidistance principle would fall within the Indian EEZ. 
What are the bases for the conflicting claims? 
The choice of the method for lateral definition of the 
continental shelves is the central issue. The Indian position is that 
the equidistance line should be used. Bangladesh on the other hand 
would find itself in a disadvantaged position by using the 
equidistance method, The concavity of its coastline would pull the 
line of its boundary inwards so that the lines drawn at the 
Bangladesh-India and Bangladesh-Burma boundary will not run parallel 
to each other but meet at a relatively short distance from the coast 
as shown in Figure 2, Thus the continental shelf of Bangladesh would 
take the form of a triangle depriving it of the continental shelf 
outside of the triangle. 
Figure 2 Here 
In order to mitigate the drawback of its recessed coastline, 
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Bangladesh has announced a ten fathom baseline and declared its 12-
mile territorial sea and 200-mile EEZ from this line. 11 The great 
rivers of Ganges (called Padma in Bangladesh) , Jamuna and Meghna carry 
an enormous load of silt that they deposit in the ocean making the 
seaward slope extremely gentle in the Bengal Basin.12 The ten fathom 
contour line in some places is as much as 50 miles from the shore. If 
used as a baseline it would enclose hundreds of miles of shelf within 
Bangladesh's internal waters and nullify the adverse effects of a 
concave coastline. 
However there are serious problems with the 10 fathom 
baseline. India has rejected it and it has not met with any 
acceptance by the international community despite the efforts of 
Bangladesh at many international forums. The 1958 Convention of the 
Continental Shelf as well as UNCLOS III overwhelmingly approved the 
low water line as the normal baseline,13 A baseline that is likely to 
be changing and moving southward (with the deposition of silt in the 
course of time) is unlikely to meet with general acceptance and can 
easily be rejected by India. It is likely that the ten fathom 
baseline is simply a bargaining position for Bangladesh. 
Another more recent attempt on the part of Bangladesh has been 
to lobby for the drawing of straight baselines along the farthest 
seaward extent of submerged sedimentary delta in areas where most part 
of a coastline is constituted by a continuous process of sedimentation 
of fluvial deposit rendering the low water line unstable.14 With the 
acceptance of 12-mile territorial seas and 200-mile EEZ, there is not 
much enthusiasm at UNCLOS III for changing the low water line as the 
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basis for drawing the baselines, It is unlikely that Article 7 of the 
Draft Treaty will reflect this addition which would benefit 
Bangladesh. 
A stronger case against the equidistance method has been made 
by Bangladesh on geomorphological grounds. South of the Sunderbans 
near the mouth of the Kunga and Malancha rivers is a deep underwater 
crevice called the 'swatch of no ground' as can be seen in Figure 2. 
Bangladesh is said to prefer a maritime boundary that would follow the 
alignment of this crevice15 which would allocate a more generous 
portion of the seabed to its EEz.16 Here Bangladesh can make a much 
stronger case by arguing that the 'swatch of no ground' is a "special 
or unusual" feature that was recognized by the International Court of 
Justice as a factor that should modify the strict median line 
principle in the North Sea Continental Shelf decision cited above, 
Bangladesh can also cite other precedents as in the Australia-Papua 
New Guinea case. 17
' 
' India can coun.ter this by contending that the 
'swatch of no ground' is just a depression in the seabed and cannot be 
considered a legally relevant "unusual feature, " India can buttress 
its position by citing other precedents. The much deeper and wider 
Norwegian trench was ignored as a limiting factor and the continental 
shelf boundary between United Kingdom and Norway was delimited 
strictly on the equidistance method. 18 
Bangladesh can make the strongest argument for its position by 
referring to the principle of geographical equity established by the 
ICJ. It can point to its meagre share of the continental shelf as 
opposed to the large gain of India in proportion to their respective 
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coastlines as shown in Table 1. 19 The I CJ had stated in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases that the use of the equidistance method of 
delimitation is not obligatory between parties. 
A maritime boundary dispute in which both sides can cite 
different principles can only be resolved through negotiations and 
compromises. Negotiations between Bangladesh and India were first 
initiated in 1974 and after a three year gap have been going on since 
1978. Whether the two parties would be willing to make concessions 
depends upon other aspects of their relationship. The dispute over 
the sharing of the river water, the construction of the Farakka 
Barage, the proposed exchange of small land enclaves on the Indo-
Bangladesh border, the treatment of non-Muslim minorities in 
Bangladesh, the alleged overt and covert Indian support of insurgents 
among other things have soured the relations between the two 
countries, 
However now that the Farakka barrage issue has been 
satisfactorily resolved, it is possible that progress may be made on 
the maritime boundary as well. Reluctance of many petroleum companies 
to undertake exploration in disputed areas may prove to be an 
incentive for India and Bangladesh to resolve the matter 
expeditiously. The State Department is reported to have informed U.S. 
based operators that they should not expect to be protected in certain 
areas if a dispute erupted into open hostilities.2
0 No commercial 
d i scov ery w a s  reported from the wildcats drilled in the areas leased 
out by Bangladesh and no further drilling seems to be planned in the 
near future. This may therefore be an opportune time for both parties 
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to enter into an agreement. Boundary settlement would facilitate the 
search for offshore oil and, perhaps, even pave the way for joint 
exploration of the area. 
India and Pakistan have not reached any firm agreement on their 
maritime boundaries. This is not surprising in view of the fact that 
only a decade ago there were many unclear and undefined boundaries 
between neighboring states on land areas which were sparsely populated 
and had difficult terrain. Accessibility and opportunity give rise to 
territorial claims. When a population of some density wishes to make 
use of the resource of an area with unclear title, it may touch off a 
conflict of interest that requires territorial demarcation. Perhaps 
the same holds true for maritime boundaries between contiguous states 
as well, 
The oil potential of the seabed lends an urgency to the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries; it also hardens positions as 
states are unwilling to relinquish claims. The converse is true for 
areas like the Indus basin between India and Pakistan where the seabed 
has not been considered promising for hydro-carbons. However both 
India and Pakistan have accepted the method of equidistance to 
delineate their maritime boundary even though the actual mechanics of 
an agreement have not yet been worked out. 
India and Sri Lanka completed the process of boundary delimitation in 
1977 through three separate agreements, The first agreement, the most 
difficult of the three since it involved conflicting claims to the 
island of Kacchativu, concerned the Palk Strait area. Kacchativu 
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island is half-coral half-sand, about 3.75 square miles in area, is 
uninhabited except for a chapel and is located in the Palk Strait 
about 12 miles from the nearest Indian coast and 10.5 miles from Sri 
Lanka. 
Dispute over ownership of the island of Kacchativu was one of 
the unsettled colonial legacies inherited by India and Sri Lanka. 
India had a strong case, its claim to the island deriving from a grant 
made to the Raja of Ramnad in 1802. The government of Sri Lanka cited 
cartographic evidence as well as the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of 
the diocese of Jaffna over St. Anthony's chapel on the island. 
Neither party could prove actual display of state activities to the 
exclusion of the other. The island had become a source of discord 
between the two countries and was discussed by the representatives of 
the two countries quite regularly since 1956. In 1968 the problem was 
magnified because some gunboats of Sri Lanka were sighted off the 
coasts of Kacchativu at the time of the annual fair at the shrine of 
St. Anthony. Thus the island of Kacchativu had become the major 
obstacle to a boundary agreement and had created a climate of 
suspicion that was affecting the entire range of relations between the 
two countries. 
By the agreement signed in June 1974, India relinquished its 
claims to the island. The agreement in the Palk Strait was drawn on 
the equidistance principle except in the area of the Kacchativu island 
where the line was drawn about 11 miles from the nearest point in 
India and one mile from the Kacchativu island. In other words, while 
the island was allocated to Sri Lanka, as a concession to India, the 
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position of the median line was not affected. Indian pilgrams and 
fisherman were also permitted by the agreement to visit the island 
without visas as before. 21 
By the other two agreements the boundary was extended in the 
Bay of Bengal area and in the Gulf of Mannar up to a trijunction point 
between India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives within 200 miles of each 
country's coast.22 Figure 3 shows the maritime boundary between India 
and Sri Lanka. 
Figure 3 Here 
The resolution of boundary disputes can be central to the 
ocean policy of a country. With their maritime boundaries in the seas 
well defined, India and Sri Lanka are now undertaking a serious effort 
to explore for offshore oil in the area. Ceylon Petroleum Corporation 
has entered into a production sharing arrangement with Ceyoil, a 
subsidiary of American Pexamin Pacific Inc. on its northwest coast. 
It has leased out blocks in the Palk Bay. 23 India has also given 
exploration contracts in the Gulf of Mannar to a Canadian firm24 and 
in the Palk Strait to an American consortium.25 The agreement on 
maritime boundaries was also accompanied by an agreement on fisheries. 
Fishermen from Sri Lanka were allowed to continue fishing in the Wadge 
Bank in the Indian EEZ for three years until 1979 and were given five 
h f h h . f. h" . h 26 years t erea ter to p ase out t eir is ing activity in t at area. 
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II. Transnational Stocks of Fisheries 
Fish are a living resource; they are mobile and have no 
respect for political boundaries. They swim inshore, offshore and 
alongshore. This means that land based jurisdictional concepts or 
concepts for management of mineral resources are much more difficult 
to apply to fisheries. Stocks that migrate across the economic zones 
of neighboring contiguous or opposite states may give rise to conflict 
over distribution of resources as evidenced by the conflict between 
U. S. and Mexico on tuna. The problem of sharing transnational stocks 
varies in different parts of the world because of the differences in 
productivity of waters, the length and configuration of the coastline 
and the type of stocks -- some fish are more mobile than others. 27 
So far there have been no fishing disputes in South Asia with 
the exception of some minor incidents in which fishermen from 
Tamilnadu were arrested for encroaching in the Sri Lanka waters. The 
absence of disputes on fisheries in Southern Asia can be attributed to 
several factors. First, all states in the region have long coastlines 
and share only a few stocks. Second, the shrimp stocks, highly 
coveted in the region as a source of foreign exchange, are found well 
within the 200-mile zone. There are no known instances in which 
significant shrimp stocks migrate through the EEZ of more than one 
state. Third, the pelagic and demersal species in the region are 
underutilized. According to the U. N. Food and Agriculture 
Organization, less than 22 percent of the potential commercial catch 
is harvested from the Indian Ocean. This proportion is low compared 
to the other oceans of the world where current landings are well over 
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half the estimated potential.28 When a stock is underutilized there 
is not much possibility of a conflict. It is only when a stock is 
fully utilized that additional catch by one nation impinges upon the 
catch of other nations giving rise to conflicts. 
Underutilization of stocks, however, may not last for long. 
All the countries in the region have announced ambitious plans to 
expand their ports and buy trawlers and deepsea fishing vessels which 
can operate at great distances and harvest far bigger catches. Each 
country will try to recover its investment in equipment by more 
aggressive fishing. In the absence of sharing arrangements, this will 
result in higher costs and may even result in depletion of stocks. 
For example, if a stock swims between India and Pakistan, India has no 
incentive to conserve the stock because it would only be reducing its 
own catch in favor of its neighbor unless both countries can come to a 
joint agreement to share the total sustainable yield of that species. 
The attempt on the part of each country to maximize its own share of 
the transnational stock by buying more and bigger trawlers may lead to 
unnecessary capitalization and increase in the per unit cost of fish 
for all. 
A South Asian country may conclude that the best way of 
exploiting the fish stocks in its EEZ is to sell them to the highest 
bidder. That would alter the present situation of underutilization to 
full utilization rather quickly. In the past, the presence of large 
quantities of trash fish (fish unacceptable to consumers) in the South 
Asian waters deterred distant water fishing vessels but that may 
change now for two reasons. One, under the new fishing regime, 
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countries like Japan, Soviet Union and South Korea have idle fleet 
capacity as their traditional fishing grounds have been enclosed off 
in EEZs. Two, since the collapse of the anchovy fishery off Peru, 
there has been a dramatic increase in the world price of fish-meal. 
The current demand for meat in the developed countries ensures that 
the demand for fish meal which is used to feed poultry and cattle will 
remain high even when the anchovy industry is revived. If fishmeal 
factory ships of distant water fishing states are given access by a 
country in its EEZ, it will affect the neighboring state which also 
harvests these migratory stocks. For example, the operation of such 
vessels off the coast of Pakistan would certainty affect the 
livelihood of the artisanal fishermen in Gujerat. Similarly the catch 
of the fishermen in Bangladesh would be reduced if India were to allow 
fishmeal factory ships to operate in its EEZ in the Bay of Bengal. 
Thus because of the nature of transnational stocks, the desire 
of each state to improve its own returns can lead to rivalry and 
potential conflicts unless an understanding to share the stocks is 
reached among neighboring states. Similar situations in other parts 
of the world indicate that controlling excess effort or resource 
depletion after it has occurred is trying to unscramble an egg. 
Bilateral management has to proceed in step with growth in fishing 
capacity. 
III. Pollution Problems 
The watermass is an ecological whole. The extension of 
maritime jurisdiction will crosscut ecological boundaries. Under the 
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stimulus of exclusive jurisdiction, there will be an increase in the 
use of oceans for fishing, mining, and for promoting tourism. Oil 
spills, or blow outs, in the economic zone of one country could well 
destroy the beaches or the shrimp industry of the neighboring states. 
Oceans are a fluid medium; the manner in which one state enjoys its 
share of the oceans and seabed cannot be contained and isolated from a 
similar use by other states. The intensive and extensive use of 
oceans in the coming decades, the heightened awareness of the 
significance of ocean resources, and assured title over the most 
valuable segments of the ocean under the new law can bring neighbors 
onto a collision course. 
POSSIB ILITIES OF COOPERATION AMONG COUNTRIES OF SOUTH ASIA 
The new legal regime of the oceans also presents opportunities 
for cooperation. Surveys of the continental margin can be undertaken 
jointly. Sri Lanka and India have agreed to an exchange of survey 
data gathered in the Palk Bay by the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation and 
in the Cauvery basin area by the Oil and Natural Gas COllllllission of 
India in order to get a more meaningful interpretation of the area 
between India and Sri Lanka.29 Development of the untapped fisheries 
of the Indian Ocean is contingent upon adequate information on the 
numbers and distribution of species and their rate of growth, 
mortality, recruitment and migration patterns. Statistics on catch to 
effort ratio are necessary in order to analyze increase or decrease in 
the level of effort required to achieve the optimal yield. 
Cooperation among neighboring states may extend to the collection, 
compilation and interpretation and exchange of statistical 
information. 
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There are possibilities of cooperation also with regard to the 
enforcement of the 200-mile zone. Detection and identification of 
unauthorized foreign fishing activity in thousands of square miles of 
EEZ will be costly, requiring radar telecollllllunication equipment, 
patrol vessels, and trained personnel. Even nominal surveillance 
could be very expensive for the developing countries. The South Asian 
countries will surely be better off if they pooled their resources and 
efforts. However, cooperation presupposes good neighborly relations. 
Under the impetus of the extended maritime jurisdiction, the 
next decades are going to see increased attention on the part of the 
South Asian countries to tap their marine resources. At the present 
time the only maritime conflict is between Bangladesh and India, the 
boundary dispute between India and Sri Lanka having been resolved. 
The future may still bring conflicts on transnational stocks. 
It is paradoxical that the extension of national jurisdiction 
creates rather than obviates the need for negotiations and agreement 
among neighboring states. The treaty can only provide broad 
guidelines for boundary delimitation and the sharing of transnational 
stocks. Since the geographical and resource circumstances are unique 
in individual cases, specific rules cannot be incorporated in the 
treaty but have to be agreed upon on the basis of bilateral or 
regional negotiations. The salience of maritime issues may strengthen 
regional arrangement among certain groups of nations which have close 
cultural, economical and political links and have a functioning 
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institutional framework for joint action. The prospects of peaceful 
settlement of the maritime conflicts generated by the extension of 
zones of national jurisdiction will depend on the perceived value of 
the ocean resources and the general nature of the relationship between 
the neighboring states. 
21 
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Table 1 
*Area (in sq. naut. miles) 
**Length of Coastline Enclosed Within 
Country (in miles) 200 Meter Isobath 200 Nautical Miles 
Bangladesh 310 16,000 22,400 
India 2,759 131,800 587,600 
Pakistan 440 17,000 92,900 
Sri Lanka 650 7,800 150,900 
*Indian Ocean 
(Total Area, -- 917,000 7,064,000 
28,842,000 sq.n.m. 
Source: 
*U.S. Department of State, Limit Series, No. 46, August 12, 1972. 
**U.S. Department of State, Office of the Geographer, Geographic 
Bulletin No. 3, "Sovereignty of the Sea," Washington, D.C., 1969. 
Country 
Bangladesh 
India 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
- - - - - - -
United States 
1979 
0 
23 
0 
0 
- -
- -
1037 
Table 2 
Offshore Wells 
1978 1977 
1 2 
20 36 
1 1 
0 0 
- - - - - - - - - -
1082 1215 
Source: Offshore, June 20, 1980. 
1976 1975 
5 1 
18 NA 
1 1 
2 NA 
- - - - -
- - - - -
I 966 932 
I 
Figure 1. 
legend: CJ. Shoreline to 200 meter isobath 
[1:�':):·:i Continental platform deeper than 200 meters 
� Continental slope 
.. Continental rise 
Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Geographer, Major 
Topographic Divisions of the Continental Margins, July 1970. 
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